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Councillors and locals alike in Buxton, Derbyshire, had a strong sense of 
civic identity relating to the town’s reputation as a spa and site of leisure in 
the interwar period. The council clearly saw its civic role as maintaining 
this prestigious image. The imposition of housing powers from the central 
government in 1919 therefore raised an important question in the area: how 
far did the council’s responsibility to housing the local working classes 
extend now that they had the means to improve conditions? The unpredict-
able complexities of state policy certainly had an effect on the progress of 
housing schemes in the town, yet a close examination of the intricate and 
local culture of perceived responsibility reveals the importance of a very 
localised decision-making process. From the resolution to build, through the 
problems in implementing housing schemes, to the management of tenants 
and property following construction, it was the local authority that had the 
power to make substantial changes. Buxton was a small rural town, without 
a popular belief that it was blighted by typical urban problems of overcrowd-
ing and slums. It instead looked to its status as a spa town to inform 
housing policy decisions. By elucidating Buxton’s experience, as opposed to 
larger industrial cities with familiar problems of housing and slums, a dif-
ferent analysis of local intervention can be contributed to the historiography 
of council housing in Britain.
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With the introduction of the Housing, Town Planning &c Act 1919, a defi ning 
moment in the development and extent of British state intervention was reached.1 
1 My special thanks to Professor Simon Gunn of the University of Leicester and Dr Nick Hayes of Nottingham 
Trent University for their invaluable guidance, criticisms and suggestions in researching and writing this 
piece.
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This act, which included an exchequer subsidy for municipal house building, was the 
fi rst of many housing measures passed in the interwar period, as defi nitions of state 
responsibility for housing changed and adapted to the political and economic forces 
working within Britain. Whilst the state was the facilitator of housing subsidies, it 
was local authorities that were required to investigate housing need in the area, plan 
housing schemes under ministry of health supervision, build the houses, and fulfi l the 
role of landlord. Buxton in this period was a small rural town that still proudly held 
onto its eighteenth- and nineteenth-century heritage as a luxurious spa location. By 
assessing the development and idiosyncratic results of housing policy in this place, as 
opposed to the larger and more urban industrial centres with outwardly recognisable 
housing issues, a contribution can be made to the history of local politics and 
decision-making in the interwar period.
The origin of state intervention has been well documented in the historiography 
of housing. After the introduction of the Land Value Duties in 1910 the output of 
houses, which had already been falling, decreased markedly, to the extent that losses 
to the housing stock through demolition were not balanced with construction in some 
towns.2 The demanding nature of total war meant that the building of houses had 
come to a virtual standstill between 1914 and 1918, as labour and materials fl owed 
to war work.3 At the end of the First World War, therefore, housing requirements 
stood at approximately 600,000.4 The fundamental issue in the development of 
housing policy at the central level was the realisation that private enterprise, under 
the imposition of the Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, could not 
meet this defi cit and provide houses to be let at a profi table rent. The principle of a 
subsidy to offset these restrictive conditions was fi rst formally discussed in 1916, and 
was generally accepted within the government as a fi nite, but necessary, measure to 
overcome the housing shortage.5 
Rising industrial and social disturbances formed the backdrop to the introduction 
of this subsidy, with over thirty-fi ve million days lost in strikes in 1919, compared to 
fi ve million in 1918.6 The strength of the labour movement had increased during the 
war years, as the membership of trade unions grew from four million in 1913 to eight 
million in 1919.7 Whilst there has been some disagreement with regard to the extent 
this rising industrial strength and unrest had on informing the government’s decision, 
the ‘homes fi t for heroes’ campaign, as championed by Lloyd George, certainly pro-
mised to radically improve the conditions of housing. Whether or not this was out of 
a genuine concern for social conditions of housing, or as a way to placate potential 
revolutionaries, is certainly debatable.8 Yet local authorities had been given new 
2 J. Burnett, A Social History of Housing: 1815–1985 (London, 1978), 221.
3 S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain (London, 1979), 31.
4 M. Bowley, Housing and the State: 1919–1944 (London, 1945), 12.
5 Merrett, State Housing, 33.
6 Ibid., 32.
7 Ibid., 32.
8 See, for example, M. Swenarton, Homes Fit For Heroes: The Politics and Architecture of Early State Housing 
in Britain (London, 1981), 70–87; C. Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-War 
Coalition 1918–1922 (London, 1990), 127–9; M. J. Daunton, ‘Introduction’, in M. J. Daunton (ed.), Council-
lors and Tenants: Local Authority Housing in English Cities, 1919–1939 (Leicester, 1984), 3–11; P. Shapely, 
The Politics of Housing: Power, Consumers and Urban Culture (Manchester, 2007), 31–3.
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and daunting powers that could greatly change and improve local conditions. Some, 
however, were much more reluctant than others.9 The question centred then on 
whether individual local councils would choose, and continue to choose, to exercise 
that authority, and if so, under what conditions and constraints.
Whilst Buxton was relatively small with a population of approximately 15,600 in 
1921, there was some recognition that there was a housing problem in the area.10 
Although the initial defi cit was judged to be small and manageable, at only one 
hundred houses, the council still struggled to build (see Table 1).11 The result of this 
was an increasing defi cit. As the population grew to 18,800,12 and over 130 houses 
were condemned by the health committee,13 private enterprise still failed to alleviate 
the problem of a lack of affordable housing stock. This defi cit was not cleared at any 
stage; the council did not build any houses after 1933 and, in 1939, the situation had 
deteriorated far beyond the 1919 level.
Whilst state legislation and central–local relations also affected Buxton’s housing 
policy, it is the notions of civic responsibility, and the perception of the local 
authorities and local press, that can explain so vividly the response of the Buxton 
council. This will hopefully reaffi rm that the history of council housing does not end 
with the formulation of policy at the central level,14 since the decision-making process 
9 Jennings has shown the large disparities in building rates between local authorities. For example, under the 
Wheatley Act of 1924, at opposing ends of the scale, Carlisle built 45.5 per 1000 people, Walsall 40.8, and 
Smethwick 33.9, whilst Salford, Grimsby, Blackpool, Croydon and Southend all failed to build more than 
1.3 houses per 1000: J. H. Jennings, ‘Geographical Implications of the Municipal Housing Programme in 
England and Wales 1919–1939’, Urban Studies, 8/2 (June 1971), 128.
10 ‘Population, Acreage, Private Families and Dwellings’, 1921 Census of England and Wales, Derbyshire 
County Report, Table 3, viewed at http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk.
11 Derbyshire Record Offi ce (hereafter DRO), ‘Housing and Town Planning Committee Minutes’ (hereafter 
‘HATPCM’), D1323/2/18/1 (10 February 1919).
12 ‘Population by Sex and Year of Birth (and Age) in Great Britain and the Isle of Man. England and Wales — 
Counties, Boroughs, Urban and Rural Districts’, 1939 National Registration of United Kingdom and Isle of 
Man, Population summary, Table 3A, viewed at http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk.
13 DRO, ‘Health Committee Minutes’ (hereafter ‘HCM’), D1323/2/15/2-4 (1930–1939). 
14 Daunton, ‘Introduction’, Councillors and Tenants, 3.
TABLE 1
HOUSES BUILT IN BUXTON IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Year building commenced Houses built
1921   3
1923  26
1924  36
1926  68
1930  40
1931  40
1933  60
Total 273
Source: DRO, ‘HATPCM’ (1918–1945).
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at the local level was both complex and changeable; consequently, so were the results. 
By analysing the unique notions of civic responsibility that operated in Buxton, the 
local decision-making process can be fully explained. Councillors, the press and locals 
alike had a convoluted view of who held responsibility for housing, and this clearly 
affected the formation of policy at the local level.
The nature of civic responsibility
Existing studies of local interwar housing schemes have concentrated on the political 
composition of the authorities in question, with most studies showing that a Labour 
council was more likely to implement a progressive policy with regards to housing, 
when compared relatively with a Conservative dominated council.15 Yet more recent 
work has emphasised the need to assess municipal action within a framework of 
civic culture and notions of civic responsibility. Hayes particularly has highlighted the 
importance of ‘a city’s intrinsic view of itself’ in the decision-making process; political 
allegiance mattered less than an authority’s perception of need and responsibility.16
Members of the Buxton council stressed, at least to the local populace, the value 
of refraining from party politics altogether. At one point Councillor Howe stated that 
he ‘never wished to bring political issues into local government’, a stance the local 
press supported throughout the period.17 Indeed, the opposition towards political 
allegiance from the press can be seen in the occasion any candidate stood for a party. 
For example, the Herald recognised in 1923 the Labour Party’s ‘grave error of judge-
ment and tactical blunder’ in nominating a candidate to challenge the highly popular 
non-party Councillor Goodwin, and was proved right with the subsequent landslide 
defeat.18 Surviving records of clear political allegiance are lacking, perhaps due to the 
absence of the importance applied to such allegiances, or the implications of publicly 
campaigning on a party political basis.19 The composition of the council at the 
outbreak of war in 1939 however displays a telling picture: of twenty-two councillors, 
fourteen claimed to be Independent, fi ve were Labour, and three were Ratepayers 
Association members.20
Although the rate of house building was slow, this is not to suggest that every 
member of the council disagreed with a policy of intervention. Still, it was only a 
minority that whole-heartedly supported the council as a provider of houses — espe-
cially at the start of the period. Unsurprisingly perhaps, as an employer of a large 
amount of labour in Buxton and also the chairman of the industrial council of 
Buxton, Councillor Ryan radically advocated the construction of some 1300 houses 
15 R. Ryder, ‘Council House Building in County Durham, 1900–1939: The Local Implementation of National 
Policy’, in Daunton, Councillors and Tenants, 39–100, at 50.
16 N. Hayes, ‘Civic Perceptions: Housing and Local Decision-Making in English Cities in the 1920s’, Urban 
History, 27/2 (2000), 211. See also Shapely, Politics of Housing, which focuses on Manchester.
17 Buxton Herald (hereafter BH), ‘Behind the Civic Chair’ (hereafter ‘BTCC’) (6 October 1938).
18 BH, ‘Council Minutes’ (hereafter ‘CM’) (25 October 1923). 
19 B. Keith-Lucas and P. G. Richards have noted the tendency of candidates in this period to use titles such 
as Independent, Municipal Reform, Ratepayers, Progressive, Municipal Alliance, and others; hence the diffi -
culty of ascertaining the political loyalties of local politicians: B. Keith-Lucas and P. G. Richards, A History 
of Local Government in the Twentieth Century (London, 1978), 100, 111–12.
20 BH, ‘Occasional Notes’ (5 November 1936).
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as soon as possible.21 The Buxton Herald ridiculed such grand schemes, describing 
with apparent glee the consequent failure of the ‘vision’ for a ‘sort of workers 
paradise’ on Heath Grove, which became the main site for Buxton council houses.22 
Several councillors, however, agreed on the necessity of municipal action on more 
moral grounds. When considering Lloyd George’s promise of ‘homes fi t for heroes’ 
Councillor Hall candidly stated that ‘they had got some heroes in Buxton’ and argued 
that the Buxton council should meet such a promise.23 
These notions of civic responsibility, however, were much more prevalent in the 
preliminary stages of interventionist discussion than the actual planning of schemes. 
When Councillor Swain, another supporter of progressive policies in housing, sug-
gested a starting scheme of 128 houses, the response was unenthusiastic. Councillor 
Goodwin, the chairman of the Housing Committee, insisted ‘Let us start with forty 
fi rst.’24 This was characteristic of the interwar period in Buxton; cautiousness was 
consistently advocated over speculation. Councillor Buckley, seen by the more 
reformist councillors as consistently ‘putting the matter on the shelf’,25 stressed the 
need to approach the matter of housing slowly.26 This is understandable; the imposi-
tion of house building powers so suddenly upon a small council, such as in Buxton, 
could certainly represent an overwhelming experience. Furthermore, the Buxton 
council, and to a lesser extent the local press, had a tendency to see overcrowding 
and slum housing as a particularly urban phenomenon that did not apply in Buxton. 
Even though the health committee calculated in 1936 that 5.08 per cent of working-
class dwellings in Buxton were overcrowded, compared to a national average of 
3.08 per cent, the fact that these properties were dispersed across the town rather 
than concentrated in districts, as in larger urban areas, seemed to quell any notion of 
Buxton being a town that was facing a distinctively pressing housing problem.27
The argument externally voiced in favour of cautiousness was concerned with the 
necessity to keep down the rates. As a member of the fi nance committee for most of 
the interwar period, with a stint as the local chancellor of the exchequer in the 1930s, 
Councillor Buckley held much sway in the decision-making process. Whilst one must 
be cautious of attributing causation to an individual, especially when discussing a 
council consisting of twenty-two members, Buckley strongly did not favour housing 
policy if it involved municipal subsidy from the rates, and consistently argued for this 
position.28 He was not alone in this belief; the announcement of any decrease in the 
rates was met with cries of ‘hear hear’ and applause.29 The Herald was certainly a 
constant advocate of the importance of this responsibility to the ratepayers of Buxton, 
questioning whether ‘a local authority ought to burden the rates with a charge of this 
nature’.30 Bromley and Hayes have noted the importance of the provincial press in 
21 BH, ‘CM’ (12 November 1919).
22 BH, ‘BTCC’ (14 December 1922).
23 BH, ‘CM’ (13 October 1920).
24 Ibid. (11 January 1923).
25 Ibid. (7 February 1924).
26 Ibid. (9 March 1921).
27 DRO, ‘HCM’ (1930–1939).
28 BH, ‘BTCC’ (12 May 1932).
29 BH, ‘Axe on Buxton’s Rates’ (8 March 1922).
30 BH, ‘The Housing Question’ (16 April 1919).
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this period, as the ‘mediator of civic constructs of progressiveness and improve-
ment’.31 Whilst it is diffi cult to quantify precisely the impact that the press had on 
shaping civic culture, it is viable to suggest that the Herald did enhance and justify 
the persistent arguments emerging from the council chamber. 
In Buxton the burden on the rates was approximately 2 per cent of the total income 
in 1932, after the council had built 213 of the eventual 273 houses.32 Whilst this desire 
to decrease the reliance on the rates to a minimum is understandable, it is when a 
comparison is made with expenditure in other areas that the motivations of the coun-
cil are revealed. In the same budget the rate defi ciency of the Buxton Natural Baths 
and Wells was 11.5 per cent, whilst the maintenance of the Pavilion Gardens was 
8 per cent. Such expenditure, essentially subsidising the town’s attractions which were 
actually running at a loss, was deemed necessary for the ‘future prosperity of this 
town’ in generating a return income.33 It was in the preservation of Buxton’s civic 
identity as a spa and leisure town therefore through investment, rather than spending 
to provide housing as a social service, that the council saw its prime responsibility. 
This did not allow for the fact that a proportion of Buxton’s inhabitants were 
actually members of an industrial working class. As the borough surveyor observed 
when discussing plans for post-1945 development: ‘Buxton is a spa and Buxton is the 
centre of an important quarrying and lime-burning industry.’34 Yet the spa function 
of the town was seemingly diminishing. Whilst there were ‘queues outside the picture 
houses’, the Opera House was ‘empty’, the Pavilion Gardens were ‘poorly attended’, 
and the Baths were making a loss of as much as six thousand pounds a year.35 These 
ailing ventures were being subsidised by those who seemingly had no wish to use 
them. This was a fact not missed by Councillor Bounds and Councillor Bagshaw — 
two of the emerging progressive characters of the council in the 1930s. As Bounds 
stated: 
Housing [is] only costing a three penny rate, but what about the 1s. 6d. paid by the 
railwaymen, the quarrymen and other workers, for the Baths? What benefi t did they 
receive?36
Prevailing beliefs circulating within the council were that civic responsibility for 
housing lay outside the remit of local authorities. Most Buxton councillors instead 
viewed their civic responsibility as investing in enterprises that they believed would 
generate tourism, and thus income for the town. If there was to be a body that built 
houses, not out of speculation and enterprise but to provide for the working classes, 
it should be the local employers of labour — a policy the Herald also supported for 
the majority of the interwar years.37 But it was mainly private industry the council 
31 M. Bromley and N. Hayes, ‘Campaigner, Watchdog or Municipal Lackey? Refl ections on the Inter-War 
Provincial Press, Local Identity and Civic Welfarism’, Media History, 8/2 (2002), 197.
32 Based on calculations from BH, ‘Buxton’s Budget’ (10 March 1932). Whilst this does seem very low, it is worth 
mentioning that M. Bowley has calculated that the national average at this time was, at 0.8 per cent, even 
lower: Bowley, Housing, 15.
33 BH, ‘CM’ (24 March 1927).
34 Ibid. (April (?) 1943).
35 BH, ‘Buxton’s Budget’ (10 March 1932).
36 Ibid.
37 BH, ‘The Housing Question’ (16 April 1919).
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looked towards as providers of housing. Opponents of extensive council housing in 
Buxton cited traditional economic principles over philanthropic and ‘socialist’ atti-
tudes in support of these beliefs. It was noted in hindsight, for example, that houses 
were viewed unfavourably if they failed to recoup their building cost through rent.38 
Intervention in the housing market through a state subsidy was seen not as a viable 
social service, but as retarding traditional building, with Buckley proposing that the 
council stop house building altogether in early 1921 to see if private enterprise would 
naturally take over, a common suggestion at this time.39 When the housing subsidy 
was cut in 1921 under the ‘Geddes Axe’ it is unsurprising then that the loss of powers 
was not greatly mourned by the council. Councillor Swain admitted ‘Why should we 
worry?’ and suggested letting the private builders get on with the task.40
It was in the attempted implementation of the Victoria Park Scheme in 1935, 
a sharing of civic responsibility between state, local authority and building fi rms, 
that the council truly demonstrated its ideological commitment to private enterprise. 
Victoria Park, cleared land situated in the working-class district of Fairfi eld, seem-
ingly offered the perfect location for a working-class residential area. The money 
for the land was to be borrowed from the ministry of health, and then the building 
would be undertaken by private fi rms with some guidance from the local authority.41 
Such was the faith in this new scheme that it attracted the support of even the more 
reforming members of the council (such as Bagshaw, Brindley and Bounds), and the 
housing committee, now supposedly unneeded, was disbanded in late 1935.42 The 
scheme was expected to cater for all of Buxton’s housing needs, whilst absolving 
the local authority from primary responsibility.
It was clear by the middle of 1937, however, that this scheme was not going 
to come to fruition, due to cost, the conditions of the economy, and a diffi culty in 
organisation. Private enterprise was now fi nally seen as not able to ‘meet the require-
ments’ that the council had placed upon it.43 Whilst it had taken eighteen years, there 
was a realisation that the council’s notions of civic responsibility would have to 
change. Unsurprisingly, the Herald also recognised that policies required adaptation. 
The need for working-class housing now became front-page news as the number of 
applications for houses grew to four hundred, the number of people living in over-
crowded dwellings was revealed to be 792, and the Buxton Ratepayers’ Association 
declared, ‘Buxton in this matter cannot sit still.’44 The Herald urged progress using 
any means possible,45 whilst Councillor Goodwin, again chairman of the housing 
committee, made his intent clear: ‘The duty of the housing committee is plain and 
clear — to go forward and build.’46 The pressure to act mounted on all sides; the 
kind of apathy shown to previous housing schemes subsided as the press, and pressure 
38 DRO, ‘Post-War Development Committee’, D1323/2/33/1 (26 January 1939).
39 BH, ‘CM’ (9 March 1921).
40 Ibid. (2 November 1921).
41 BH, ‘Victoria Park Housing Scheme’ (12 March 1936).
42 DRO, ‘HATPCM’ (November 1935).
43 BH, ‘700 to 900 on the Waiting List’ (11 March 1937).
44 BH, ‘Buxton Ratepayers’ Association Annual Meeting’ (4 April 1938).
45 BH, ‘Council Housing Policy Attacked’ (13 January 1938).
46 BH, ‘CM’ (13 January 1938).
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groups using the press as a mediator, urged the council onwards. A scheme for sixty-
two houses in Fairfi eld under the Housing Act of 1935 was pushed through relatively 
quickly, when compared with earlier schemes, and plans for more houses in the 
Heath Grove area were in the preliminary stages. Unfortunately, the outbreak of war 
interrupted this much more progressive programme.
Whilst it is possible at fi rst glance to agree with Bowley’s hypothesis that the 
‘inertia and ineffi ciency’47 of local authorities impeded council house building, closer 
examination, in this case, reveals a complex local culture of perceived responsibility. 
The ‘civic pride’ in abolishing slums that Shapely has noted as instrumental in the 
civic culture and policies of housing in Manchester can be applied equally to Buxton’s 
attempts to safeguard its reputation as a spa town.48 Yet when the council had 
realised its ideologies to be incompatible with the situation at hand, its notions of 
responsibility did seem to change.
Local–central relations and the nature of state policy
The important decision to build however was only one part of a long process; in 
order for a housing scheme to be implemented, it had to be sanctioned fi rst by the 
ministry of health.49 Therefore, if one identifi es civic responsibility as a key defi ning 
factor, notions of state responsibility must also be examined; the view that the state 
either had to or should intervene in public housing is too simplistic. Central policy 
on housing varied immensely throughout the interwar period, changing on average 
every two and a half years.50 Undoubtedly this lack of a cohesive and continuous 
policy affected the decision-making process of local authorities; stability was essential 
to an authority that was planning a substantial housing scheme.51 Local policy was, 
therefore, an interpretation and reaction to national policy, based on localised views 
of circumstances.52
The Housing, Town Planning &c Act 1919 (‘Addison Act’) was the fi rst and most 
generous piece of housing legislation to be passed in this period, since it limited 
the fi nancial liability of all local authorities to one penny in the pound on the rates.53 
The authorities in Buxton failed to build any houses under this measure, a fact later 
rued by the chairman of the housing committee.54 This was not due to unwillingness 
on the part of the Buxton council; the ministry of health would not sanction any of 
Buxton’s proposed schemes, ranging from plans for three houses to more substantial 
schemes of fi fty houses.55 It is unsurprising then that it was during the period of the 
Addison Act that relations between the Buxton council and the government were 
most strained. 
47 Bowley, Housing, 33.
48 Shapely, Politics of Housing, 101.
49 Merrett, State Housing, 36.
50 F. Berry, Housing: The Great British Failure (London, 1974), 44.
51 Bowley, Housing, 109.
52 Shapely, Politics of Housing, 18.
53 Daunton, ‘Introduction’, Councillors and Tenants, 33.
54 BH, ‘Rotary Club Meeting’ (26 May 1932).
55 DRO, ‘HATPCM’ (15 September 1921).
245URBAN GOVERNANCE AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY
It is easy to understand the government’s rejection of Buxton’s proposed schemes; 
Buxton’s tenders for a block of four non-parlour houses submitted to the ministry 
in February 1921 equated to a cost of £1120 per house.56 When compared with the 
average tender price accepted at this date of seven hundred pounds, which was still 
much higher than the 1914 level of £235 due to building costs standing at 198 per cent 
greater than the pre-war level, the housing commissioner’s contention that ‘the 
tenders . . . are very much in excess of the prices he was prepared to accept’ is reason-
able.57 Due to the nature of the open-ended subsidy, the government was extremely 
worried about the possible extravagance of local authorities unnecessarily pushing 
up costs.
Some possible explanations were offered by Buxtonian contemporaries as to why 
building costs were so high locally. It was mainly believed that it was compulsory to 
use stone in building, since ‘bricks would not do in this neighbourhood, owing to the 
action of the air’.58 When Buxton did eventually use bricks, it was then argued that 
Buxton’s ‘isolated position’ from the brickfi elds made transport costs restrictive.59 
The cost of preparing foundations, roads and sewers was also high due to the town 
‘being on the rock’ — alluding to the limestone composition of the area.60 Whilst 
these factors may have been valid, private correspondence between the ministry and 
the Buxton council reveals more telling factors: the impact the civic perception of 
Buxton’s councillors had on house design and, consequently, housing cost. Following 
the request of the ministry architect that attention be given to economy, the housing 
committee tersely replied: ‘The class of house indicated by the commissioner is, in the 
opinion of this committee, entirely unsuitable, and will in a few years become slum 
property.’61 
Consequently, the housing committee would not accept any of the commissioner’s 
economy modifi cations on room size or materials, and so did not receive sanction for 
the Addison subsidy.62 The committee instead proceeded with its own designs on the 
Cliff Road site of Fairfi eld, using the Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890, 
which granted a lump subsidy of £260 per house but did not entail government 
supervision in design (see Figures  1 and 2). The results were viewed disdainfully by 
locals and in the press on aesthetic grounds, with criticism ranging from ‘scathing to 
deadly’ and, at an excessive cost of £1178 per house, the council was further secured 
in its preference for private enterprise.63 Whilst it is debatable whether the council 
wished to have the role of a local housing provider, the houses that were built had 
to be of a high standard in order to maintain Buxton’s image as a spa town. As one 
post-1945 planner stated: ‘rows of box-like industrial dwellings do not harmonise 
with the distinctive general architecture of the town’.64 This stipulation in local 
policy drove up costs and provided a distinct barrier in central–local relations.
56 Ibid. (21 February 1921).
57 Ibid.
58 BH, ‘CM’ (9 March 1921).
59 BH, ‘BTCC’ (7 September 1931).
60 Ibid.
61 DRO, ‘HATPCM’ (17 October 1919).
62 BH, ‘CM’ (13 October 1920).
63 BH, ‘Peakland Jottings’ (2 February 1921).
64 DRO, ‘Some Notes on Post-War Development of Buxton’, D1323/2/33/1 (February 1942).
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ﬁ gure 2 Sherwood Road (Heath Grove Site), built 1926. After the erection of the Cliff Road 
houses, which were uniquely designed but criticised on an aesthetic and cost basis, the 
Buxton council resolved to use the now widely familiar designs as provided by the ministry 
of health for the rest of the town’s schemes.
Photo: author
ﬁ gure 1 Cliff Road (Fairﬁ eld) Houses, built 1921.
Photo: author
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Still, the national conditions that were forcing building costs to be so drastically 
high in the early 1920s were beginning to abate; the prices of most building materials 
and wages did not rise in 1920, and by 1921 were either static or falling.65 After reach-
ing a peak average of £930 per house in August 1920, costs steadily fell to £665 in 
July 1921.66 It is not unreasonable to suggest that the price of building in Buxton 
could have followed this trend to an extent where the tenders were at a low enough 
level to be palatable for the ministry of health. Yet, though costs were falling, the 
government decided at this point to discontinue the Addison subsidy as part of the 
so-called ‘Geddes Axe’, a series of cuts in public expenditure.
This seemingly ‘perverse reversal’ has garnered much debate in the historiography 
of council housing.67 Swenarton’s persuasive argument in favour of viewing the 
passing of the Addison Act as an ‘insurance against revolution’, pointing towards 
the high standard of architecture and design, contends that with the collapse of the 
postwar boom the power of labour was drastically reduced — negating the need for 
pacifi cation through social reform.68 The increasingly vocal Anti-Waste League now 
had justifi cation for their calls to cut public expenditure.69 M. J. Daunton, however, 
has argued that more emphasis should perhaps be placed upon the government’s 
desire to defl ate and return to the Gold Standard — the orthodox economic theory 
of the period.70 
Whilst it is diffi cult to arrive at a conclusive explanation for why the government 
cancelled the subsidy at this time, the message that the action conveyed was clear: 
local authorities had been absolved of their responsibility. In 1922 the new minister 
of health expressed the hope ‘that future State intervention will not be required, 
and that the building industry will return to its pre-war economic basis’.71 That the 
pre-1914 ‘welfare state’ measures of social insurance, old-age pensions and free 
elementary education were not cut back by the Geddes Axe displays that the state’s 
interpretation of their responsibility did not extend so readily to housing.72 This was 
greeted not with surprise, but with a mixture of praise and regret at the local level. 
The Herald stated, ‘It is clear then that the housing problem will not be solved by 
public bodies meddling in building matters’,73 whilst Councillor Swain lamented that 
‘the Government had not carried out their agreement’.74
Local–central relations had not commenced in a constructive manner. The Buxton 
authorities viewed the government as unnecessarily blocking schemes, whilst the 
government could not see past the admittedly high costs in Buxton. Relations were 
to improve however, as consequently did the construction rate in Buxton. Whilst the 
Housing &c Act 1923 (‘Chamberlain Act’) attempted to restore private enterprise 
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68 Swenarton, Homes Fit For Heroes, 189.
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as the suppliers of working-class housing, and in line with prevailing Conservative 
ideologies, it did also offer a subsidy to local authorities — though they had to prove 
that they were fulfi lling a role private enterprise could not.75 After the crescendo of 
costs the treasury had experienced with the Addison subsidy, Chamberlain fi xed the 
subsidy at the rate of six pounds per annum per house for twenty years. This left state 
intervention at a relatively low and secure level, since expenditure by local authorities 
did not need to be overly supervised.76 The Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1924 
(‘Wheatley Act’), passed under Labour, also followed this guideline, though with a 
much higher subsidy of nine pounds per annum per house for forty years. Wheatley 
also reversed the Chamberlain policy of local authorities having to prove that they 
were providing a service private enterprise could not, re-establishing local authorities 
as the provider of social housing.77 
The Buxton housing committee now had less trouble in achieving authorisation for 
schemes. As the housing commissioner stated in 1925: ‘it is noted that the tender 
proposed to be accepted is high, and that the loan is now sanctioned on the assump-
tion that the council has satisfi ed themselves there is no prospect of obtaining lower 
prices’.78 Costs indeed still remained relatively high. In 1925 tenders for non-parlour 
houses in Buxton stood at £680, compared to the national average of £510. Whilst 
the liability of the treasury was now secure, the councillors of Buxton were left with 
an unenviable choice; either subsidise the high cost out of the rates, or charge higher 
and more economic rents. Whilst this subsidy policy was more welcome than none 
at all, and the difference in tenders between Buxton and the national average had 
actually fallen to twenty-four pounds in 1933, the lack of an equalising nature in the 
legislation meant the Buxton authorities had more of a burden than an area with low 
building costs for much of the 1920s.79
Yet it was arguably the unstable and changing nature of the subsidies that hindered 
progress the most; as the central party in power changed, so did notions of state 
responsibility and, consequently, the subsidy granted. The Conservative party clearly 
viewed state intervention in housing as a temporary measure to remove shortages so 
that controls over the housing market could be ended.80 Macintyre has taken this even 
further, stating that the Conservatives’ commitment to reform was, at best, ‘shallow’; 
Conservative measures represented a pragmatic and populist response to the growing 
power of the Labour Party and the electorate.81 It was the Labour Party that 
unsurprisingly introduced the more progressive and generous subsidies, such as the 
Wheatley Act, though they lacked the political and economic stability to implement 
them.82 It was mostly therefore a Conservative government that administered 
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the subsidies, a government that did not wish to see subsidies continued beyond the 
minimum amount of time.83 
Ideological differences between parties were exposed clearly in the administration 
and manipulation of housing legislation. The Conservative Chamberlain Act, which 
was initially only for a period of two years, was extended by Labour for fi fteen years 
in 1924, only to be cancelled in 1929 by a Conservative government. The actual 
amount the subsidy granted was reduced by the Conservatives in 1927 to two-thirds 
of its value, whilst the Wheatley subsidy was lowered from nine pounds to £7 10s, in 
a measure of economic retrenchment. Bowley has noted the signifi cant drop in the 
investment of local authorities following these reductions; whilst Conservatives 
thought that falling building costs would offset the cutback, housing committees 
felt unease at starting new schemes in an unstable economic environment.84 This 
was particularly noticeable in Buxton; no new schemes were commenced from 1927 
to 1930, until costs had fallen signifi cantly.85 J. Dale has viewed such central actions 
of reduction in subsidy amount and timescale as a vital tool that central authorities 
could utilise to curb building, and therefore costs, without creating confrontation 
with local authorities — a seemingly successful tactic in the case of Buxton.86 
Housing policy under the Chamberlain and Wheatley Acts was clearly erratic; local 
authorities faced continually changing circumstances. When the Wheatley subsidy 
was cancelled in 1933, after the recommendations of a committee on local expendi-
ture in 1932,87 there was no sign of protest from Buxton councillors. With the passing 
of the Housing Act 1930 (‘Greenwood Act’) policy was to turn to a sanitary policy 
of slum clearance — though it was effectively postponed until 1933 due to economic 
instability.88 This legislation was then supplemented with the Housing Act 1935, 
which offered a subsidy of fi ve pounds per annum for twenty years for each dwelling 
erected to overcome overcrowding. Yet from the cancellation of the Wheatley 
subsidy until the proposed Dale Lane scheme in 1938, no plans from Buxton were 
submitted, nor were any houses constructed.
The government certainly did not push the Buxton authorities towards a pro-
gramme of slum clearance, since only towns of twenty thousand or more were 
required to prepare a specifi c plan for an attack on the slums. Though the health 
committee only condemned 135 houses as unfi t in the whole of the 1930s,89 the per-
missive nature of state legislation meant that local authorities could evade their duties 
no matter how small; failure at the local level should also be viewed partly as a 
failure of the ministry of health.90 As long as the government was unwilling to force 
its hand, it seems the Buxton council was quite content to wait for private enterprise. 
As far as local councillors were concerned, the state had, following the cancelling of 
the Wheatley subsidy in 1933, again rejected its responsibility for housing, after a 
83 Dale, ‘Class Struggle’, 206.
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gradual erosion of subsidies in generosity and timescale. To a certain extent this 
authorised and informed the views of Buxton councillors on the nature of civic 
responsibility; as Ryder states: ‘[not] any one local authority operated in a vacuum 
outside the changeable atmosphere of the central government policy’.91 The new slum 
clearance policy was seemingly not viewed as a crisis; it was only when the Victoria 
Park Scheme failed that the housing situation reached this point, and the housing 
committee was re-formed with a more progressive outlook. 
The council as landlord
Though the council may not have wanted to build, their role following construction 
is still worth examination, since the policies followed by the council affected the lives 
of the new tenants, and their use of urban social space.92 The variety of choices to be 
made by the council were both unfamiliar and problematic, none more so than the 
setting of rents and the policy of tenant selection. Decisions made in this respect form 
the core of the ‘housing problem’ of the interwar period; namely, who should benefi t 
from the new and novel public intervention in the fi eld of housing. Yet the extent of 
housing management goes beyond this; the movement of people from varying com-
munities into newly planned areas marked a watershed in local roles of intervention.93 
Robert Finnigan has stressed the necessity of questioning these estates, and the 
extent to which new communities were created as opposed to ‘mere aggregations of 
dwellings’.94 Local authorities had a ‘wide measure of autonomy’ from the ministry 
of health in this respect.95 It is unsurprising then that localised views of civic 
responsibility again shaped the policies that the council implemented. 
The setting of rent levels was a balancing act, with the weight of the variables 
determined by local opinion. In order for rents to be low, the burden upon the rates 
had to be higher so as to subsidise the cost of building. For much of the interwar 
period in Buxton there was a tendency to view this as a negative measure. As the 
Herald stated: ‘all subsidies are bad. Every article, whether large or small, a pin or a 
house, should pay for its manufacture.’96 The housing committee, in the main, agreed 
with this assessment, stating that ‘it is the duty of the Council to see that the rents 
approximate, even if they do not actually reach, the economic level’.97 The high cost 
of building meant either a considerable percentage had to be paid out of the rates, or 
rents had to be substantially higher. The housing committee chose to utilise the 
Chamberlain subsidy until it was discontinued, as opposed to the more generous 
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Wheatley subsidy, since it gave full control over the setting of rents. The level 
decided upon for the parlour houses built between 1923 and 1926 therefore was 
14s 0d per week, exclusive of rates.98 
That this seems very high, compared to the national average rent of council 
houses of 7s 9d in 1926, is perhaps irrelevant.99 What is more revealing is the diffi -
culty the inhabitants of Buxton’s council houses had in paying these rents. By 1932, 
15 per cent were in arrears, a fi gure not surprising given the level of unemployment 
at this time.100 Individual cases reveal a far more substantial problem. For example, 
one household accrued an incredible £43 of arrears in three years — though it is 
necessary to note that one of the two adult occupants died part way through the 
tenancy.101 Another case displays a more pressing issue. In fi ve years of tenancy, one 
tenant had let arrears build up to the sum of £18. When he had taken up the tenancy, 
with his wife and four children, he was earning a wage of £2 10s a week. He was, 
therefore, paying almost 33 per cent of his wage in rent.102 As the housing committee 
recognised, the rent levels were far out of the tenant’s reach, and were more suited 
to a wage of £4 or £5 a week.103
It is here that a substantial fl aw and contradiction in the council’s rent levels and 
tenant selection is apparent. It has been recognised in the historiography of council 
housing that many local authorities operated a pragmatic approach to tenant selec-
tion, choosing those more ‘desirable’ and able to pay.104 This led to a situation where 
council houses were effectively limited to ‘the better-off families, the small clerks, the 
artisans, the better-off semi-skilled workers with small families and fairly safe jobs’.105 
Yet the Buxton council did not display any such ‘vetting’ of tenants, and openly 
prided itself upon guaranteeing that those most in need got the houses fi rst — regard-
less of ability to pay.106 The tenant selection process was delegated to the philan-
thropically minded Women’s Advisory Committee, who strived to alleviate the ‘worst 
and distressing cases’.107 The result of this, however, was frequent rent arrears and 
subsequently a strict eviction policy following three weeks of non-payment.108
The council’s policy towards rent levels did become more progressive — though 
this correlated with falling cost levels as well, as Table 2 shows. The key changing 
point in policy came in 1930, when the council was forced to use the Wheatley Act, 
due to no other subsidies being available. This confi ned rents to a maximum level. 
Eventually the council even went further than this, reducing the rents of the 
Chamberlain houses from 14s 0d to 12s 6d, 10s 6d to 9s 6d, and 10s 0d to 9s 6d, and 
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the Wheatley houses from 7s 8d to 6s 6d in 1933.109 This placed an extra burden of 
£152 per annum on the rates.110 Rent reductions, whilst an improvement, were not 
substantial. It is unsurprising then that the tenants of the fi rst Chamberlain houses 
greeted the news with indignation and ‘disgust’, since lowering rents was an admis-
sion that they were too high, but the amount was so small that it did not make 
a tangible difference.111 Predictably perhaps, and to the dismay of councillors, a 
high amount of subletting continued, with the result that the overcrowding rate 
in municipal houses in 1936 was twice as high as in standard working-class 
dwellings.112
Management of council houses also involved much more than rent policy, such as 
the fostering and assimilation of communities. This presented less of a problem for 
the housing schemes located in the Fairfi eld area of Buxton since these schemes were 
integrated into what was already recognised as a ‘working-class district’.113 Fairfi eld 
was well equipped with a post offi ce, newsagents, fi shmongers, dairyman and con-
fectioner, and was within a short distance of the shops and recreational activities of 
Spring Gardens — the main shopping area of the town.114 Heath Grove’s housing 
estate presented a greater problem in this respect, being some distance from ‘the 
town’s main attractions’.115 With 77 per cent of Buxton’s council houses located on 
this new and peripheral estate, the formation of a community was essential; it was in 
109 Ibid. (14 March 1933).
110 Ibid.
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TABLE 2
BUILDING, COSTS, HOUSE TYPE AND RENTS
Act used Year* Type   Cost Initial rent
1890 Act 1921 Parlour £1178.00 12s 6d
Chamberlain 1923 Non-parlour £505.00 10s 0d
Chamberlain 1923 Parlour £680.00 14s 0d
Chamberlain 1924 Parlour £680.00 14s 0d
Chamberlain 1926 Parlour £681.00 14s 0d
Chamberlain 1926 Non-parlour £564.00 10s 6d
Chamberlain 1926 Non-parlour £526.00 10s 0d
Wheatley 1930 Non-parlour £450.00 7s 8d
Wheatley 1931 Non-parlour £432.00 7s 6d
Wheatley 1933 Non-parlour £386.00 6s 6d
*Year building commenced
Source: DRO, ‘HATPCM’ (1918–1945).
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reality only on Heath Grove that ‘families had to build up a new neighbourhood and 
community life from the beginning’.116
Through the employment of an architect, and substantial deliberation, the estate 
took on a well-planned exterior. The maintenance of the properties on the estate was 
of clear importance to the council, and the housing committee employed a housing 
manager, a decision only one-fi fth of local authorities took in this period.117 The 
housing committee and housing manager were willing to provide the funds to paint 
fences, erect sheds, and make other improvements on the estate.118 Furthermore, 
in cooperation with Buxton Gardeners’ Association, yearly cash prizes of £1 10s 
(approximately two weeks’ rent and rates) were given to the best presented garden, 
with amounts also given to second and third place.119 This arrangement was 
mutually benefi cial; tenants had a more attractive property, whilst the council could 
maintain the image of Buxton as a pleasant spa town. The council also actively 
secured and maintained a substantial piece of land, though this did change location 
in the mid 1930s, as a recreational ground for local children. This site remains a focal 
point for the youth of Buxton today.120 This small but important measure displays 
that feelings of civic responsibility did extend beyond the maintenance of Buxton’s 
image as a leisure destination; only the most cynical observer would suggest that the 
welfare of its new tenants was completely superfi cial.
Though these small measures did help formulate a sense of community on Heath 
Grove, it was still substantially lacking in the shops and amenities that were numer-
ous in Fairfi eld and other parts of the town. Perhaps even more important than this 
was Heath Grove’s isolation from the workplace. This fact was certainly recognised 
by some councillors: Councillor Sawdon appreciated that railwaymen could be called 
up for work with ten minutes notice, and so living on Heath Grove was not an 
option.121 Others were not as sympathetic: Councillor Macdonald protested that he 
had to travel across Buxton and then fi fty more miles to work.122 Travel was 
particularly problematic for those who worked at the Grin Works lime quarry and 
other places in the area of Burbage. As Councillor Wilde stated: ‘They did not want 
to come to Heath Grove when they had fi nished work.’123 
That the council encountered problems with tenant selection, location and ameni-
ties is to be expected. As Jevons and Madge conceded: ‘it is perhaps inevitable 
that any authority which embarks for the fi rst time on an ambitious programme of 
housing will make serious mistakes’.124 Buxton council’s mistakes were perhaps not 
so much in the housing it built, but in its inability to provide the quantity to overcome 
the growing defi cit.
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Conclusion
In 1938 alone the number of new housing applications was 399,125 whilst the existing 
waiting list was already ‘anything from 700 to 900’ in 1937.126 Whilst the council 
steadfastly denied that this quantity equated to the housing need in the area, indeed 
their estimate was a more conservative two hundred houses, there was still an admis-
sion that not enough houses had been built to relieve a problem that was growing 
into a crisis.127 This fi gure of two hundred was only seventy or so less than the 
council had built in the whole of the interwar period, an indicator of how far behind 
the housing schemes had fallen. The 1920 evaluation of housing need had been esti-
mated at fi fty houses, and, by this barometer, the council had met and far surpassed 
the supposed need. Yet the need for houses constantly grew, and at a much faster rate 
than the council could meet. 
Yet if the pace of the early 1930s had been maintained, when 140 houses were built 
in three years, it is not unrealistic to suggest that the housing needed in 1939 could 
have been a much less signifi cant amount. Whilst the cancelling of the Wheatley 
subsidy in 1933 actually marked the end of municipal house building in Buxton in 
this period, it is too simplistic to place all of the blame upon the central state and the 
limitations of its policies. Instead, it is necessary to reaffi rm the signifi cant impact that 
the failure of the Victoria Park scheme had on the housing problem in Buxton. This 
scheme would have provided two hundred working-class dwellings, with space for 
future development. The policy followed by the council, essentially preparing plots 
of land abutting onto roads, which were then to be sold to private builders under 
strict letting conditions, failed.128 Quite simply, because of the conditions suggested 
by the council, the income return was not attractive enough to entice private builders 
to build down to the rent level needed, essentially the issue at the crux of discussions 
of state intervention before even 1914.129 Whilst the preparation of the land had 
taken longer than envisaged, the rising building prices in 1936–7 exacerbated this 
situation, and essentially crippled the potential of the scheme.130 
Nonetheless, other subsidies for municipal house building were open to the Buxton 
council following 1933. That they did not take these subsidies represents the key issue 
of Buxton’s strategy in the interwar period; once the government had seemingly 
reversed the policy of underlying responsibility for general housing needs, local 
notions of responsibility followed suit. That the council placed all of its hopes on 
collaboration with private enterprise on the Victoria Park land reveals its commit-
ment to existing notions of civic responsibility in the fi eld of house building. The 
perceived civic identity of Buxton was its reputation as a quaint spa and leisure town, 
defi ned in opposition to the notion of the big city and its slums. The very idea that 
such a town could experience a working-class housing crisis was mostly ignored in 
the town until the late 1930s, when the problem broke away from the editorial and 
comments pages of the Herald, and became consistently front-page news. 
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Clinging to the ill-judged scheme of Victoria Park, and instead concentrating on 
tourism and leisure functions, stagnated any other possible municipal house building 
for most of the 1930s. By the time the council realised that private enterprise could 
not function in Buxton to the extent required, it was too late: the schemes prepared 
were interrupted by the Second World War. Postwar opinion from the Herald and 
the council displayed an admission that the policies and notions of responsibility, 
which had essentially hampered municipal house building, had to change if Buxton 
was to overcome the housing crisis. Clear regret was shown for the ‘former slackness’ 
identifi ed by the progressive-minded Councillor Bagshaw, who had now risen to 
chairman of the postwar housing committee.131 The Herald lamented: ‘Would that 
we could put the clock back fi fteen years and make the housing estates twice as big 
as they are. Now it is too late.’132 The postwar housing committee now realised that 
former policies were ‘short-sighted and wrong’ and that the responsibility for housing 
workers from outlying industries was the duty of the local authorities and not the 
industries in question.133 Such regret, which was essentially based on the astute 
realisation that past principles had been misguided, must not be taken out of context 
with the benefi t of hindsight. It would be naïve to suggest that the council could, 
or should, have adapted to their new role as house providers with enthusiasm and 
success straight away. The existing civic culture and notion of civic responsibility 
were formidable barriers to overcome in this respect — barriers made higher by the 
changeable and uncertain nature of state policy and state responsibility. 
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